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Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.: What Should be
the Role of International Comity in the Issuance
of Antisuit Injunctions?
I.

Introduction

As the world economy develops, the various participating nations become more interdependent.' Inevitably, disputes arise that
encompass the jurisdiction2 of more than one sovereign. This Note
will focus on two questions that are certain to arise with increasing
frequency as the United States continues to become more interdependent with other nations, namely: (1) when a case or controversy
falls under both the jurisdiction of the United States and that of a
foreign sovereign, under what circumstances should the United
States try to assert exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) what should be the
United States' response when the foreign sovereign attempts to assert exclusive jurisdiction? Examining the recent decision of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co. ,
this Note discusses the court's position in these matters and whether
the federal court's positions are correct.
By examining the court's decision, this Note will discuss how the
courts use the principle of comity4 in situations where there is over-

I See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implicationsfor Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 299 (1991); DavidJ. Abrams, Note, Regulatingthe InternationalHazardous Waste Trade: A
Proposed Global Solution, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (1990).
2 Jurisdiction in its broadest sense includes the pragmatic quality necessary for the
court to enforce its decisions. Thus, "[j]urisdiction is the power of the court to decide a
matter in controversy, and presupposes the existence of a duly constituted court with control over the subject matter and the parties." Pinner v. Pinner, 234 S.E.2d 633, 636 (N.C.
App. 1977). Therefore, regardless of how foreign, or American, when courts purport to
determine their jurisdiction, a necessary feature of their actual jurisdiction is that the court
have "power" and "control" over the subject matter and the parties.
This requirement shows the circular relationship between recognizing a court's order
or judgment and the court's actual jurisdiction in a situation where the parties and subject
matter are beyond the court's scope of control and power. By recognizing the court's
jurisdiction, and thus giving the court power and control over the subject matter and the
parties, the court's jurisdiction is affirmed. If a court's judgment or order is not recognized on the rationale that the court does have proper jurisdiction, the court may be left
powerless and effectively without jurisdiction.
3 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992).
4 In a leading Supreme Court case on comity the Court stated that:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
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lapping jurisdiction.5 This Note will also examine the current split
among the circuit courts concerning how comity should be applied in
this situation. In conclusion, the author will argue that, contrary to.
current policy, only where there is a risk of violating international
law or treaty provisions should United States courts attempt to obtain exclusive jurisdiction.
II. Statement of the Case
A.

The Transaction Giving Rise to the Promissory Note

Gau Shan Company (Gau Shan) is a Hong Kong corporation,
with its assets in Hong Kong, 6 that markets cotton to the People's
Republic of China. 7 Julien Company (Julien) is a Tennessee corporation that uses Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust), an American corporation, as its primary source of financing its cotton sales.8
Gau Shan sought assurances that Bankers Trust would provide the
funds necessary forJulien to release cotton that Gau Shan wished to
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894).
Comity is an elusive concept without a precise definition that is universally accepted.
Joel R. Paul, Associate Professor, at the Washington College of Law, The American University, stated that:
Comity has been defined variously as the basis of international law, a rule of
international law, a synonym for private international law, a rule of choice of
law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns, a
moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or "considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.
Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
Comity is defined in BLACK's Law DICTIONARY as follows:
Courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a
matter of right, but out of deference and good will. Recognition that one
sovereignty allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
act of another sovereignty, having due regard to rights of its own citizens. In
general, [the] principle of 'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction
will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction,
not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect.
BLACK'S Law DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
5 While the concept of comity includes matters such as recognition of foreign judgments and orders in United States courts, this Note will limit its main focus to comity's role
in deciding whether antisuit injunctions are issued, or should be recognized, in parallel
proceedings in the United States and a foreign jurisdiction concerning the same in personam claim.
While this Note is concerned with the concept of comity as between the United States
and foreign sovereigns, it should be noted that "the concept of comity also applies to the
relations between other sovereign entities, including the federal and state governments in
the United States." Richard W. Raushenbush, Note, Antisuit Injunctions and International
Comity, 71 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1064 n.141 (1985).
6 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1358.
7 Id. at 1351.
8 Id.

1993]

ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS

477

purchase from Julien and sell to the People's Republic of China. 9 In
response to this request for assurances, Andrew Halle, a vice president of Bankers Trust, assured Gau Shan "that he 'would work
something out.' "10 Based on these assurances, Gau Shan agreed to
sell 15,000 metric tons of cotton to China and contracted withJulien
as a source of supply."I
Halle learned afterward thatJulien had an overdue debt owed to
LOR, Incorporated (LOR) that was unrelated to the contracts with
Gau Shan. BecauseJulien did not have the funds to pay the overdue
debt, Halle suggested that Julien pay the overdue debt with money
that Bankers Trust would prepay to Julien for the cotton Julien
agreed to sell to Gau Shan. 12 Halle then called Gau Shan in Hong
Kong and told them "that Bankers Trust could not advance the necessarymoney toJulien unless Gau Shan signed a $20 million promissory note payable to [Bankers Trust]."' Under protest, Gau Shan
signed the note.
Bankers Trust deposited $20 million in Julien's account and
then wired the entire $20 million out of Julien's account to LOR's
account in another bank in satisfaction of the unrelated overdue
debt.' 4 Halle anticipated that LOR, upon satisfaction of the debt,
would release some certificated cotton that Julien was selling to yet
another party. This unrelated sale was to produce funds that could
be used to purchase the cotton that Julien contracted to supply to
Gau Shan. 15 Things did not go entirely according to plan, however,
and "[b]ecause of some problems with the release of the certificated
cotton, Julien shipped to China only about 24% of the cotton it had
agreed to ship on Gau Shan's behalf."' 16 This resulted in Gau Shan
only fulfilling part of its contractual obligation to the People's Republic of China.
B.

The District Court's Action

Bankers Trust demanded payment on Gau Shan's note advising
Gau Shan that if payment was not made by February 26, 1990, it
9 The court's opinion in Gau Shan does not specify why funds had to be provided to
Julien for the release of the cotton, only that "Gau Shan, sought assurances ...that Bankers Trust would provide funds necessary for Julien to release, at Gau Shan's request, the
cotton Gau Shan wished to sell to China." Id.
10 Id.
I d.
12 Id.
13 Id.

14 Id. While it is unclear from the opinion whether Julien had given Bankers Trust
authority to wire the $20 million to LOR, Halle previously instructed Julien's chief administrative officer "that when the $20 million was credited to the Julien account she was to
wire the money to Julien's creditor, LOR, Inc., to pay off that debt." Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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would file suit in Hong Kong for collection on the note.1 7 Rather
than paying the note, however, Gau Shan filed suit in "the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee on February 23, 1990, asking for rescission of the note, alleging that it was
induced to sign it by Halle's fraud."' 8
On February 23, the district court issued a temporary restraining order, followed at a later date by a preliminary injunction
enjoining Bankers Trust from initiating a suit in Hong Kong regarding the note against Gau Shan.1 9 The district court determined at
the hearing for the preliminary injunction that:
Gau Shan would be irreparably harmed if Bankers Trust sued Gau
Shan in Hong Kong or if Bankers Trust exercised its rights under
Hong Kong law to appoint a receiver for Gau Shan pursuant to
Hong Kong judicial 20 rocedure or under a deed of charge governed
by Hong Kong law.
The district court also determined "that Gau Shan had demonstrated

a strong likelihood that it could succeed on the merits of its underlying fraud claims." '2 1 The district court concluded that:
[T]he dictates of international comity did not preclude the issuance
of an injunction here .... [B]ecause parallel proceedings duplicate
the parties and issues, the federal courts' important public policy of
a just, speedy and inexpensive determination . . . would be evaded
should22Bankers Trust be permitted to sue Gau Shan in Hong
Kong.

C.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision
1. Deciding on the Standards

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Gau Shan held
that "review of a trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction
23
is whether the lower Court's decision was an abuse of discretion."
The Sixth Circuit court further stated that a district court abuses its
discretion" 'when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous
legal standard.' ",24 The court then began its analysis to determine
the proper legal standard for international comity and antisuit
injunctions.
17 Id. at 1351-52.

18 Id. at 1352. "Gau Shan also sought damages for common law fraud and deceit and
for negligence, and claimed treble damages under TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-109, alleging
that Bankers Trust induced Julien to breach its contract with Gau Shan." Id.
19 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1352. Because the district court's opinion is unpublished, all
of the information concerning what is in the district court's opinion is from the published
opinion of the court of appeals.
20 Id.; see infra notes 37-39, 89-94 and accompanying text for discussion concerning
Hong Kong law regarding appointment of receivers and the "Deed of Charge."
21 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1352.
22 Id. at 1354.
23 Id. at 1352 (citation omitted).
24 Id. (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Mansfield, 866 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted)).
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In Gau Shan, the court of appeals started its analysis of international comity 25 by stating that "[i]t is well settled that American

courts have the 'power to control the conduct of persons subject to
their jurisdiction to the extent of forbidding them from suing in foreign jurisdictions.' "26 The court next asserted, however, that" 'parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim should ordinarily
be allowed to proceed simultaneously, at least until a judgment is
reached in one [jurisdiction] which can be pled as res judicata in the
other.' "27
The court of appeals stated the "[t]he circuits are split concerning the proper standards to be applied, in the context of considerations of international comity, in determining whether a foreign
antisuit injunction should be issued." 28 After examining the different positions held by some of the circuits, 2 9 the court held that it
would only consider two factors in determining whether Bankers
Trust should be enjoined from proceeding with the parallel action in
Hong Kong: (1) whether the court's jurisdiction is threatened by the
foreign action; and (2) whether the court's important public policies
30
are being evaded by the foreign action.
2. Is the Court'sJurisdiction Threatened?
The Gau Shan court quoted the District of Columbia Circuit decision of Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 3' for the
premise that " '[c]ourts have a duty to protect their legitimately conferred jurisdiction to the extent necessary to provide full justice to
litigants.' "132 The court stated that threats to a court's jurisdiction
33
are quite rare and have only arisen under two scenarios.
Regarding the first scenario in which a court's jurisdiction is
25 See supra note 4 for a discussion on the definition of comity.
26 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1352 (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted)).
27 Id. (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926-27 (footnote omitted)). "Under res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based
on the same cause of action." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)
(citations omitted). The essential elements of the doctrine of res judicata "are generally
stated to be (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) an identity of the cause
of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies
in the two suits." Nash Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484,486 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). The use ofresjudicata "[t]o preclude parties from contesting
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries
from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources,
and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions." Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
28 Id. at 1352-53.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 51-71 for a discussion of the different positions
of the circuit courts on international comity.
30 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355.
31 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
32 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355 (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927).
33 Id. at 1356.
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threatened, the court declared that "it has long been recognized that
concurrent proceedings pose an inherent threat to a court's jurisdiction where the basis for that jurisdiction is in rem or quasi in rem."3 4
The court explained that this type of situation represents a threat to
a court's jurisdiction because "a concurrent proceeding in a foreign
jurisdiction poses the danger that the foreign court will order the
transfer of the property out of the jurisdictional boundaries of the
first court, thus depriving it of jurisdiction over the matter."'3 5 Because Gau Shan involved in personam proceedings, this was not a
concern.
The second scenario in which a court's jurisdiction may be
threatened, according to the Sixth Circuit, involves an in personam
proceeding "'if a foreign court is not merely proceeding in parallel
but is attempting to carve out exclusive jurisdiction over the action.' ",36 Because of differences between American and Hong Kong
law, 3 7 the possibility exists under Hong Kong law that Bankers Trust
could appoint a receiver that "would have the power.., to abandon
any proceedings concerning Gau Shan's assets. Gau Shan contends
that such an appointment could result in a dismissal of this lawsuit
without ever reaching the merits of the controversy. ' 3 8 The court
concluded, however, that "It]he possibility that a holding of a Hong
Kong court might permit Bankers Trust to gain control of Gau Shan
is not a threat to the jurisdiction of the United States courts; rather,
it is merely a threat to Gau Shan's interest in prosecuting its lawsuit." 3 9 Because the court earlier stated that "Gau Shan offers no
reason why this court should conclude that the Hong Kong courts
would enter an antisuit injunction in this case," '40 the circuit court
held that "this court's jurisdiction is not threatened."'4 1
3.

Would Important Public Policies Be Evaded?

Once the court was satisfied that its jurisdiction was not
threatened, it examined the second factor justifying an antisuit injunction, namely, whether "this court's important public policies are
being evaded by the Hong Kong action."142 Judge Ryan, writing for
34 Id. (citation omitted).
35 Id.
36 Id. (quoting China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d
Cir. 1987)). See infra notes 46, 83, and text accompanying note 70.
37 Under Hong Kong law, Bankers Trust could appoint a receiver of its choice pursuant to a "Deed of Charge." Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356. "[T]his Deed of Charge . . . is
contrary to the law of the United States." Id. "The Deed of Charge is directly analogous
to an authorization to confess judgment that is given before the transaction in question
even exists." Id at 1356 n.l.
38 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356.
39 Id.

40 Id. at 1356.
41 Id. at 1356-57.
42 Id. at 1355.
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the court in Gau Shan, stated that "[a]n antisuit injunction may be
appropriate when a party seeks to evade the forum's important policies by litigating before a foreign court." 43 The court then distina forum
guished arguments that it considered more appropriate for
44
non conveniens dismissal than for an antisuit injunction.
Gau Shan argued that because of differences between the law
that would be applied in the respective jurisdictions, important public policies would be frustrated if the Hong Kong action reached
judgment first and was asserted as res judicata in the American action. 4 5 The Sixth Circuit in Gau Shan, however, relied on the Second
Circuit's decision in China Trade46 and the District ofColumbia Circuit's decision in Laker Airways 47 for the principle that:
While an injunction may be appropriate when a party attempts to
evade compliance with a statute of the forum that effectuates important public policies, an injunction is not appropriate merely to prevent a party from seeking 'slight advantages in the substantive or
procedural law to be applied in a foreign court.' 48 Taking into account the fact that the action in the United States court was governed by state law, the court stated that "although evasion of an
important national policy might outweigh certain principles of international comity, we question whether the public policy of one state
could ever outweigh those principles." 49 The court found no other
precludes
arguments persuasive and held that "international comity
50
the issuance of an antisuit injunction in this case."

III. Background Law
A.

The Circuits' Two Main Approaches Regarding the Issuance of an
Antisuit Injunction

Although international comity has a long history in Supreme
Court cases, 5 ' the exact criteria underlying the application of the
concept has not been settled.5 2 Currently, the circuits are split on
what criteria or tests should apply when deciding whether an antisuit
injunction should be issued. 53 While the two main approaches have
43 Id. at 1357.
44 Id. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text for further discussion of forum

non conveniens criteria and antisuit injunctions.
45 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1357.
46 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987). See
supra note 36; see infra note 83, and text accompanying note 70.
47 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
48 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1357 (quoting China Trade, 837 F.2d at 37 (quoting Laker
Airways, 731 F.2d at 931 n.73)).
49 Id. at 1358.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., In re Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819); Croudson v: Leonard, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 434 (1808); Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185
(1808).
52 See supra note 4.
53 See, e.g., Raushenbush, supra note 5, at 1049-54 ("[Tjwo distinct approaches con-
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been labeled by at least one author as the "liberal" and the "conservative" approach, 54 the use of such labels may bias the analysis
before it even begins. This Note will categorize the two approaches
as the "restrictive view" and the "expansive view." The Sixth Circuit
adopted the criteria of the restrictive view in deciding that an antisuit
injunction was inappropriate in Gau Shan. 55
B.

The Expansive View

The Fifth Circuit in In re Unterweser Reederei GMBh 56 cited Moore's
FederalPractice5 7 for the position that a court of equity has the traditional power to enjoin parties properly before it from litigating in a
foreign court when such foreign litigation would: "(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings prejudice other equitable
considerations. '5 8 The Ninth Circuit embraced these same criteria
in the 1981 case of Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey
59
League.
Citing the Second Circuit opinion of In re Bloomfield Steamship
Co. ,60 the Fifth Circuit stated in Unterweser Reederei that "allowing simultaneous prosecution of the same action in a foreign forum
thousands of miles away would result in 'inequitable hardship' and
would 'tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause.' ",61 The view taken by these courts has been
cerning the use of antisuit injunctions to restrain proceedings in foreign courts have developed." Id. at 1049); Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1352-53 ("The circuits are split concerning the
proper standards to be applied, in the context of considerations of international comity,
[and] in determining whether a foreign antisuit injunction should be issued." Id.).
54 Raushenbush, supra note 5, at 1049-51.
55 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354.
56 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'don rehearngenbanc, 446 F.2d 907 (1971), rev'don
other grounds sub nom., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
57 In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d at 890 n.7 (citing JAMES MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.19 (2d ed. 1953)).
58 Id. at 890 (citingJAMES MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.19 (2d ed. 1953)).

59 652 F.2d 852, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
60 422 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970). It is curious that the court in Unterweser Reederei cites
In re Bloomfield Steamship Co., which is a Second Circuit decision, for support of its expansive
views. The Second Circuit takes the restrictive view regarding the issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. Neither of the phrases put
in quotation marks by the Unterweser Reederei court in the quotation accompanying note 61
appear in In re Bloomfield. In addition, any statements that would support the expansive
view in In re Bloomfield are clearly dicta because the Second Circuit in that case held that the
district court was within its discretion for refusing to restrain a party from pursuing an
action in the English courts. Id. at 733.
61 Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d at 896 (citing In re Bloomfield Steamship Co., 422
F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970)); accord Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 531 F.
Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn. 1982). The district court for Minnesota is in the Eighth Circuit
and stated in Cargill that: "An injunction [to enjoin one of the parties from proceeding
with a foreign action] is in order when adjudication of the same issue in two separate
actions will result in unnecessary delay, substantial inconvenience and expense to the par-
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interpreted as calling for "injunctions curbing foreign litigation that
is 'inequitable' solely because of its duplicative nature."' 62 Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit in Gau Shan stated that: "Thus, the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits hold that a duplication of the parties and issues, alone, is
63
sufficient to justify a foreign antisuit injunction."
C.

The Restrictive View

The Sixth Circuit in Gau Shan adopted the restrictive view as es64
poused by the Second Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit.
The restrictive view relies on the principle that "parallel proceedings
on the same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached in one
which can be pled as res judicata in the other."'6 5 In support of this
position are Supreme Court cases that affirm the concept of parallel
proceedings in both the federal and state court systems. 6 6 The
Court in Kline v. Burke Const. Co. 67 made the following statement regarding in personam jurisdiction:
[A] controversy over a mere question of personal liability does not
involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought
to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court in which a prior action for the same cause is
pending. Each court is free to proceed... without reference to the
proceedings in the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered
in one of the courts and pleaded in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of the principles of res
adjudicata by the court in which the action is still pending in the
orderly exercise of its jurisdiction, as it would determine any
68 other
question of fact or law arising in the progress of the case.
One of the leading cases following the restrictive view is Laker

Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.6 9 In Laker Airways, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that "only in the
most compelling circumstances does a court have discretion to issue
an antisuit injunction."' 70 The court did, however, endorse the use
ties and witnesses, and where separate adjudications could result in inconsistent rulings or
a race to judgment." Id.
62 Raushenbush, supra note 5, at 1050 (footnote omitted).

63 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992).
64 Id. at 1354.

65 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); accord Canadian Filters Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 579 (1st Cir.
1969) ("[defendant in the American suit] has a right to prefer the (foreign] court even
though this may be regarded as an inconvenience by [plaintiff] or.... be thought to involve duplication." Id.); see supra note 27 for a discussion concerning the definition and
policies of res judicata.
66 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976); Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939).
67 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
68 Id. at 230.
69 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
70 Id. at 927.
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of antisuit injunctions where "necessary to protect the jurisdiction of
the enjoining court, or prevent the litigant's evasion of the important
public policies of the forum."' 7 1 The Laker Airways analysis was embraced by the Second Circuit in China Trade and Development Corporation v. M. V Choong Yong, 7 2 where the Court held that: "Because the
[foreign] litigation poses no threat to the jurisdiction of the district
court or to any important public policy of this forum, we conclude
that the district court abused its discretion by issuing the [antisuit]
73
injunction."
IV. Significance of the Case
Although the circuits continue to be split after the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Gau Shan, the case is significant because it recognizes the
changing role of the United States in today's world economy as part
of its rationale for adopting the restrictive view on issuing antisuit
injunctions. 74 Because of the ever increasing interdependence
among sovereigns, 75 questions concerning concurrent jurisdiction,
and thus comity, will become increasingly frequent. The court in
Gau Shan points out that the analysis of the lower court was "more
properly the analysis to be used when considering a motion for dismissal of a case on forum non conveniens grounds rather than a mo'7 6
tion for a foreign antisuit injunction."
The Seattle Totems decision of the Ninth Circuit shows how courts
taking the expansive view are using forum non conveniens criteria as
part of their rationale for allowing the antisuit injunction. The court
in Seattle Totems stated that "[a]judicating this issue in two separate
actions is likely to result in unnecessary delay and substantial inconvenience and expense to the parties and witnesses."' 77 That such criteria is commonly used in evaluating forum non conveniens concerns
78
is shown by the Supreme Court decision of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert:
71 Id. In Laker the plaintiff was attempting to apply United States antitrust laws to the
conduct of British corporations. Id. at 915. The conflict in Laker involved the "fundamentally opposed national policies toward prohibition of anti-competitive business activity."
Id. at 945. More specifically, "[t]he British government objects to the scope of the prescriptive jurisdiction invoked to apply the [United States] antitrust laws; the substantive
content of those laws ...

and the procedural vehicles used in the litigation of the antitrust

laws." Id. at 946.
72 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
73 Id. at 37. The situation leading up to the action in China Trade involved a ship that
ran aground and whose cargo became contaminated by seawater. Id. at 34. The plaintiff
commenced the action in China Trade for failure to deliver the cargo as agreed to by the
parties. Id.
74 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992); see infra
text accompanying note 97.
75 See supra text accompanying note 1.

76 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355.
77 Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
78 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
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"[in] cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes
into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant
is amenable to process."' 79 The Court "developed a balancing test,
consisting of 'private' and 'public' factors, which should guide a
court in determining whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is
appropriate." '8 0 Under Gilbert, "[d]ismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy
burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his
8
choice." '
It is apparent that the criteria used in Seattle Totems, "unnecessary delay and substantial inconvenience and expense to the parties
and witnesses," '8 2 is encompassed by what the Gilbert Court held to
be important private considerations in determining if forum non
conveniens applies. The Supreme Court stated that the important
private considerations used in determining if forum non conveniens
applies are the following:
Relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if
view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
There may also be questions
as to the enforcibility [sic] of a judg83
ment if one is obtained.

When a United States court issues an antisuit injunction, rather
than using its discretionary power to decline to exercise its own jurisdiction, as under forum non conveniens,8 4 the United States court is
79 Id. at 506-07.

8o Jacqueline Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the InternationalPlaintif, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 653 (1992).
81 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 236 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Gil-

bert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)). There are two unresolved questions that arise concerning
forum non conveniens when state law is involved. First, "[s]hould federal courts sitting in
diversity apply state or federal forum non conveniens rules?" Laurel E. Miller, Comment,
Forum non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign PlaintifAccess to U.S. Courts in International
Tort Actions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1370-71 (1991). Second, is the federal government's
interest in forum non conveniens involving foreign parties so strong that it controls in
both state and federal courts? See id. at 1370. For a discussion concerning these two questions, see generally Miller, supra.
82 Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 856.
83 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. The public interest considerations espoused by the Gilbert
court "include alleviation of congested court dockets, jury duty unfairly imposed on those
with no real relation to the outcome of the litigation, and the 'local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home.' " Duval-Major, supra note 80, at 654 (quoting
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09). It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has specifically held that "[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be
given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry." Piper
Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 236 (citing Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413
(1932)).
84 Hayes Indus., Inc. v. Caribbean Sales Assoc., 387 F.2d 498, 501 (1st Cir. 1968).
"[T]he doctrines of forum non conveniens and abstention call for self-abnegation by the
abstaining court. They are not to be imposed upon the other court by one which thinks
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using its discretionary power to keep the parties from going before a
foreign court. The logic, or arrogance, of an American court dictating to another sovereign that it may not hear a case because it would
be inconvenient for parties who are subject to the foreign jurisdiction is questionable. Although technically an antisuit injunction is
not against the foreign court, as Judge Pratt of the Second Circuit
recognized: "The fact that the injunction operates only against the
parties, and not directly against the foreign court, does not eliminate
the need for due regard to principles of international comity because
such an order effectively restricts the jurisdiction of the court of a
foreign sovereign." 8 5 Also, as one author observed,8 6 the Supreme
Court, as far back as 1849, warned that "if one [court] may enjoin,
the other may retort by injunction, and thus the parties be without
remedy; being liable to a process for contempt in one, if they dare to
87
proceed in the other."
The court in Gau Shan, by refusing to consider forum non conveniens arguments as justification for an antisuit injunction, 8 implicitly recognizes that such a decision is for the foreign court to make.
As the court in Gau Shan pointed out, "[a]ntisuit injunctions.., deny
foreign courts the right to exercise their proper jurisdiction. Such
action conveys the message . . .that the issuing court has so little

confidence in the foreign court's ability to adjudicate a given dispute
fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling even to allow the possibility." '8 9 A search of the case law reveals no rationale given by United
States courts as to why they are in a better position to determine
issues concerning forum non conveniens of the foreign jurisdiction
than the foreign court, who has the parties properly before it and
whose jurisdiction would be affected by the injunction. 90
Not issuing an antisuit injunction can, however, in a case such as
Gau Shan, lead to results that may differ depending upon the jurisdiction in which the case is decided. This may come about because the
law to be applied in the case is different in the United States than in
the foreign jurisdiction. In Gau Shan, under Hong Kong law, a Deed
of Charge 9' would permit Bankers Trust to appoint a "receiver [that]
would have the power to discharge Gau Shan's employees and to
itself superior." Id. (citation and footnote omitted). "The principle offorum non conveniens
is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507.

85 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted). See supra notes 36, 46 and 70.
86 Raushenbush, supra note 5, at 1048 n.53.
87 Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849).
88 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992).
89 Id.
90 See supra note 83.
91 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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abandon any proceedings concerning Gau Shan's assets." 92 There is
no similar provision that could be applied by the United States district court. 93 The court dismisses this possibility because "Bankers

Trust has represented to the district court and to this court that it
will not exercise any of its receivership rights under Hong Kong
law" 94 and that:
The possibility that a holding of a Hong Kong court might permit
Bankers Trust to gain control of Gau Shan is not a threat to the
jurisdiction of the United States courts; rather, it95is merely a threat
to Gau Shan's interest in prosecuting its lawsuit.
However, as pointed out by Judge Jones in his concurring opinion:
Among the receiver's powers would be the right to abandon any
claims, including the instant action, concerning Gau Shan's assets.
Thus, appointment of a receiver under Hong Kong law could result
in the dismissal of this lawsuit and depletion of Gau Shan's assets
before any court of competent jurisdiction reached the merits of Gau
Shan's claims. 96 A related concern is that because a foreign judgment may be used as res judicata in a United States court, "[b]y allowing transnational business to choose legal systems imposing a
lower regulatory burden than the United9 7States, U.S. courts have
effectively lowered regulatory standards."

These concerns can be addressed with two interrelated concepts. First, there is no rationale for arguing that the United States
standard is preferable to the foreign legal standard in the jurisdiction
controlled by the foreign court. Indeed, it would seem probable
that, at least to the foreign sovereign, the foreign standards are preferable to those of the United States. Second, the first concept must
be tempered by the fact that as to the effects of the foreign court's
decision in the United States, including any res judicata effect, a
United States court "is not obligated to recognize foreign injunctions .

. .

. Although a United States court will generally enforce a

foreign order or judgment, it need not uphold any ruling contrary to
American public policy." 98 In addition, because a foreign sovereign
is just that, a sovereign, the above analysis also applies to the foreign

sovereign if the roles of the United States and the foreign sovereign
are reversed.
V. Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit recognizes in Gau Shan that "[t]he United
92 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356.
93 See supra note 37.
94 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356-57.
95 Id. at 1356.

96 Id. at 1359 Jones, J., concurring).
97 Paul, supra note 4, at 71 (footnote omitted); see also Duval-Major, supra note 80.
98 Raushenbush, supra note 5, at 1053-54 (footnotes omitted). This author also correctly pointed out that "Although fears of an unseemly race to judgment may remain, a
court may refuse to enforce a foreign judgment if it believes the foreign action was tainted
by fraud or prejudice." Id. at 1040 n.4.
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States cannot today impose its economic will on the rest of the world
and expect meek compliance, if indeed it ever could. The modern
era is one of world economic interdependence, and economic interdependence requires cooperation and comity between nations." 99
Because foreign sovereigns are truly sovereigns, it must be further
recognized that "the absence of an international consensus which
can be attained only through the treaty making process ...leaves the
decree.., clothed with domestic, not international recognition."'' 0 0
United States courts still retain the power not to recognize foreign injunctions orjudgments.10 l While no court has yet to go this
far, it appears that other than in cases involving a conflict of treaty
provisions or adjudication that would be in violation of international
law, there is little justification for issuing an antisuit injunction. We
must put our Ameri-centric arrogance aside and realize that if the
situation is not covered by a treaty and the parties are subject to foreign jurisdiction, then that jurisdiction has as much right to adjudicate the case as does the United States court system. The right of the
foreign court to adjudicate includes the right of theforeign court to dismiss the case under forum non conveniens in situations that it deems
appropriate.
If the parties are not subject to foreign jurisdiction, then the
question is moot. If the foreign judgment or injunction needs the
United States courts to help in its enforcement, this would be an indication of enough of an American interest, coupled with actual
American power, that would justify applying our standards ofjustice
if our courts feel they are required. If the help of a United States
court is not needed for enforcement of the foreign injunction or
judgment, this would indicate that the foreign sovereign's interest in
the subject matter and the affected parties is very strong and that the
United States should not be trying to dictate its laws in such
situations. 102
A further reason for requiring the judiciary to refrain from issuing antisuit injunctions, except in the limited instances mentioned
above, is that the issuance of injunctions based on other criteria
clearly involves making policy. "[T]hejudiciary should be enforcing
policies set by the legislature,"'' 0 3 not making policy, especially policy concerning our relations with foreign sovereigns. Such policy
making is better served through the treaty making process and international law, rather than through the judiciaries of the various
99

Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992).

100 In re Bloomfield S.S. Co., 422 F.2d 728, 736 (2d Cir. 1970).

101 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
102 See supra note 2 for further discussion on jurisdiction, and power and control over
the subject matter and the parties.
103 Paul, supra note 4, at 72.
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countries. 104
The Sixth Circuit in Gau Shan is moving in the right direction by
holding that antisuit injunctions should generally be issued only
when either: (1) the foreign litigation poses a threat to the jurisdiction of the American court; or (2) the foreign action threatens an
important public policy of the United States. 10 5 Although the court
in Gau Shan did not need to address it in its holding, courts in future
cases must be willing to hold that foreign litigation seldom, if ever,
poses a threat to United States jurisdiction as long as the United
States retains the right not to recognize foreign injunctions or judgments. In addition, the courts must recognize that an attempt to effectively stop a foreign sovereign from exercising its proper
jurisdiction, without a legislative or executive mandate, is itself a violation of important United States policy106
The courts adopting the restrictive view in deciding when antisuit injunctions should be issued have laid the ground work necessary for the proper recognition of foreign sovereign jurisdictions. As
future cases come before the courts, hopefully they will follow the
arguments made by courts such as Gau Shan to their logical conclusion and recognize that foreign sovereigns are, indeed, truly
sovereign.
THOMAS E. BURCK

104
105
106
by the

See Paul, supra note 4, at 79.
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
The potential significance of attempting to dictate to other sovereigns can be seen
following statement of the First Circuit: "Whatever may be the inconveniences,

comity is to be preferred to combat." Hayes Indus., Inc. v. Caribbean Sales Assoc., 387
F.2d 498, 502 (Ist Cir. 1968).

